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A-R-C-G- IS NOT THE SOLUTION FOR DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE VICTIMS
Lizbeth M. Chow+
Sometimes love hurts. In fact, research shows that thirty percent of women
worldwide will experience domestic violence at some time in their lives. 1
National studies in the United States and Britain show that men also experience
domestic violence at high levels. 2 Even more disturbing is the cultural
acceptance that domestic violence receives throughout the world. 3 This
acceptance has left far too many people unprotected and has forced them to seek
refuge outside of their home countries.4
+
J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2016; B.S., Georgetown
University, 2008. Thank you to Professor David Koelsch for your editing and advice on this
Comment. Thank you to all members of Catholic University Law Review for their editing,
particularly to Shannon McGovern. Mom, Dad, Leo, Vero, Alex, and Jeff: thank you for your
support during the writing of this Comment, and always.
1. Violence against women: a ‘global health problem of epidemic proportions’, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (June 20, 2013), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2013/violence_
against_women_20130620/en/.
2. According to a study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 22.3% of
American women and 14.0% of American men aged eighteen and older “have been the victim of
severe physical violence by an intimate partner in their lifetime.” Intimate Partner Violence:
Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/
violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/consequences.html. “More than 1 in 3 women (35.6%)
and more than 1 in 4 men (28.5%) in the United States have experienced rape, physical violence,
and/or stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetime.” MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 2 (Nov. 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf. Additionally, a survey of British criminal statistics found “that men
made up about 40% of domestic violence victims each year between 2004-05 and 2008-09,” and
48.6% of men were subjected to severe force in an incident with their partner in 2006-07. Denis
Campbell, More than 40% of domestic violence victims are male, report reveals, THE GUARDIAN
(Sept. 4, 2010, 7:07 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/sep/05/men-victimsdomestic-violence.
3. One study found that “in 29 countries around the world, one-third or more of men say it
can be acceptable for a husband to ‘beat his wife.’” Additionally, the study found that “in 19
countries, one-third or more of women agree that a husband who beats his wife may be justified, at
least some of the time.” Nurith Aizenman, Alarming Number of Women Think Spousal Abuse is
Sometimes OK, NPR (Mar. 18, 2015, 12:16 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsand
soda/2015/03/18/392860281/alarming-number-of-women-think-spousal-abuse-is-sometimes-ok.
4. See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 928 (B.I.A. 1999) (reviewing a Guatemalan
domestic violence victim’s asylum claim, but ultimately ordering her voluntary departure in lieu of
deportation back to her home country); Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A.
2014) (reviewing an Immigration Judge’s decision to deport a Guatemalan domestic violence
victim and her three children); Matter of L-R-, UNIV. OF CAL., HASTINGS COLL. OF THE LAW, CTR.
FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-l-r (last visited
Aug. 19, 2016) (detailing a Mexican asylum-seekers experiences with domestic violence).
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In the United States, an asylum claim 5 requires that the applicant be a
refugee—that is, a person fleeing persecution based on race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group (PSG).6
For a claim that does not fall into one of the first four enumerated forms of
persecution, a person’s only option for obtaining refugee status is to establish
membership in a PSG. The problem is that guidance about what does or does
not constitute a PSG has been generated on a case-by-case basis,7 leading to
confusing and inconsistent decision-making. 8 This has been particularly
consequential for domestic violence victims seeking asylum. 9 Such persons
cannot neatly claim membership in a PSG because it is difficult to show: (1) the
existence of a group when only two individuals are involved, (2) that the
persecution stems from membership in that group, and (3) that the government
in the home country is unable or unwilling to protect the victim.10 As a result,
victims are left with an unclear strategy.
Recently, however, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that victims
fleeing domestic violence might qualify for PSG-based asylum. 11 But the
decision was only a nominal victory for these refugees because it did not clarify
when domestic violence rises to the level of persecution and provided no
analysis on the nexus requirement (the requirement that the applicant
5. An application for asylum can be made in two ways. First, individuals who have been
placed in removal proceedings may apply for asylum as a defense to removal by filing with the
Immigration Court. NAT’L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR., BASIC PROCEDURAL MANUAL FOR
ASYLUM REPRESENTATION AFFIRMATIVELY AND IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 9 (May 2016),
http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/NIJC%20Asylum%20Manual_05%20
2016_final.pdf. Second, asylum-seekers who are not in removal proceedings may apply for asylum
with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Id. If an applicant is denied asylum,
removal proceedings start and the asylum application is forwarded to an Immigration Court for
review. Id. An Immigration Judge (IJ) will make a final decision on whether asylum is granted or
denied. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 8 (last revised June 10,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/02/02/practice_manual_review.pdf. If
denied, the applicant can appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA. Id. at 8–9. However, the BIA’s
decisions may be reviewable by the U.S. Attorney General (AG). Id. at 9. The AG may request
review (and issue a decision) of the specific case sua sponte, or the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) or the BIA may make a request to the AG for review of the case. Id. The asylumseeker can appeal the BIA decision to a federal court of appeal. Id. That decision, of course, may
then be appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
6. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C., ch. 12).
7. See infra Sections I.D.3.b.i–I.D.3.b.iii (explaining the three elements of membership in a
particular social group and describing several cases from which those elements derived).
8. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case
Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 109 & n.9
(2013).
9. See id.
10. See Lynn Bayes-Weiner, Note, “Family Broils” and Private Terror: A Gender-Neutral,
Psychologically-Based Approach to Domestic Violence and Asylum Law, 79 UMKC L. REV. 1047,
1054–55 (2011).
11. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A. 2014).
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demonstrate the persecution was “on account of” one of the enumerated
grounds).12 The BIA failed to provide a predictable rule for both future asylum
applicants and adjudicators.
This Comment will assess the BIA’s most recent decision on asylum for
domestic violence victims and suggest that it is ultimately ineffective. This
Comment further suggests that the only practical solution is for Congress to
intervene. This Comment first provides a brief historical overview of asylum
law to help elucidate the purpose of asylum law. It also provides an in-depth
review of the elements needed to establish a successful asylum claim and
surveys how previous domestic violence-based claims have fared. Next, this
Comment examines and appraises various existing proposals for addressing the
issue of domestic violence-based asylum. Finally, this Comment proposes two
possible changes to the refugee definition that would more adequately address
the issue of domestic violence-based asylum. This Comment also anticipatorily
rebuts the argument that granting asylum to domestic violence victims, as a
matter of law, would lead to a drastic increase in this type of asylum application.
This Comment will conclude that the decision in In re A-R-C-G- does not
provide an adequate solution for domestic violence victims seeking asylum.
Moreover, it is time for the United States to amend its refugee definition to
explicitly extend protection (via asylum) to domestic violence victims.
I. ASYLUM LAW: ITS PURPOSE, HISTORY, AND MECHANICS
A. A Brief History of International Asylum Law
Faced with eleven million displaced Europeans 13 and immense “postwar
shame”14 following the end of World War II, the international community began
to draft refugee law.15 In 1948, the United Nations (UN) adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR)16—the first international recognition
of an obligation to protect people outside a country’s own borders.17

12. Asylum Law—Membership in a Particular Social Group—Board of Immigration Appeals
Holds that Guatemalan Woman Fleeing Domestic Violence Meets Threshold Asylum
Requirement.—Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 2090,
2095 (2015) [hereinafter Asylum Law].
13. Liisa H. Malkki, Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of
Things, 24 ANN. REV. OF ANTHROPOLOGY 495, 497 & n.1 (1995).
14. Id. at 500 (describing the sense of shame throughout Europe that stemmed from the
knowledge that so many who had sought asylum during the Holocaust were turned away and
knowingly returned to face death in their home countries).
15. Id. (“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, as was the
Genocide Convention.”).
16. Id.
17. Article 14.1 of the Declaration stated that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy
in other countries asylum from persecution.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), www.un.org/en/documents/udhr.
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Three years later, the UN adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1951 Convention), 18 which provided the international community
with the first definition of a refugee 19 and established the non-refoulement
principle.20 The 1951 Convention was monumental because it was the first time
the international community recognized a duty to protect people against their
own government.21 But it was limited in scope because it was only intended to
deal with those displaced as a result of the Holocaust. 22 To remedy these
limitations, the UN developed the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1967 Protocol),23 which incorporated the previous refugee definition
and “removed the Eurocentric geographical restriction and the war-linked time
restriction.”24
B. Reluctant Adoption of Asylum Law in the United States
Like most countries, the concept of asylum law had not been developed in the
United States prior to World War II.25 Furthermore, the United States did not
make itself party to the 1951 Convention.26 Instead, Congress quietly addressed
the refugee issue in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by
including a provision that gave the Attorney General discretionary authority to
“withhold deportation of any alien . . . [who] would be subject to physical
persecution . . . .”27
In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol, but Congress did not
enact legislation to implement the policies of the 1967 Protocol.28 It was not
18. Malkki, supra note 13, at 501.
19. The 1951 Convention defined a refugee as
[A]ny person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country . . . .
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html.
20. Id. at 176. The non-refoulement principle requires that refugees should not be returned
to their home country if they would be subject to persecution. REGINA GERMAIN, AILA’S ASYLUM
PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.1.1 (6th ed. 2010).
21. See Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV. 733, 734–
35 (1998).
22. Malkki, supra note 13, at 501. The 1951 Convention was “only intended to address the
European refugee situation (covering events occurring before January 1, 1951) and not refugees as
a universal phenomenon.” Id.
23. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html.
24. Malkki, supra note 13, at 501; see also GERMAIN, supra note 20, at § 1.1.1.
25. Katherine E. Melloy, Telling Truths: How the REAL ID Act’s Credibility Provisions Affect
Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 643 (2007).
26. Id. at 644.
27. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214.
28. Melloy, supra note 25, at 644.
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until 1980, that Congress passed the Refugee Act 29 to bring U.S. law into
conformity with the 1967 Protocol.30 The Refugee Act adopted a definition of
refugee similar to that used by the UN:31
The term ‘refugee’ means any person who is outside any country of
such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .32
Notably, the U.S. refugee definition expanded the 1951 Convention definition
by allowing refugee status on the basis of past persecution as well as potential
future persecution. 33 Problematically, though, additional guidance was not
provided as to exactly what circumstances would permit protection on the basis
of future persecution.
C. Expansion of Asylum Law in the United States
American asylum law underwent two major changes in 1996 that expanded
its scope and allowed for an increase of applicants. First, Congress passed the
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 34 in
response to the influx of Chinese nationals claiming to be fleeing coercive
domestic population control measures.35 The IIRIRA added a sentence to the
end of the definition of “refugee”36 that specifically dictates what constitutes
past and future persecution for Chinese nationals fleeing on the basis of domestic

29. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C., ch. 12).
30. GERMAIN, supra note 20, at § 1.2.1.
31. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html.
32. § 201(a), 94 Stat. at 102. (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000)).
33. See Melloy, supra note 25, at 644.
34. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012)).
35. Kyle R. Rabkin, Comment, The Zero-Child Policy: How the Board of Immigration
Appeals Discriminates Against Unmarried Asylum-Seekers Fleeing Coercive Family Planning
Measures, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 965, 974–75 (2007).
36. The sentence added to the refugee definition reads:
For the purposes of determination under this Act, a person who has been forced to abort
a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for
failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive
population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of
political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced
to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or
resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of
political opinion.
§ 601, 110 Stat. at 3009-689.
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population control. 37 Second, the BIA held that female genital mutilation
(FGM) could form the basis for a claim of persecution.38
D. Elements to Construct an Asylum Application
To make a valid asylum claim, an applicant must show that (1) he or she has
been or will be subject to persecution, (2) his or her fear of persecution is wellfounded, (3) the persecution was on account of membership in a protected class,
and (4) he or she is outside his or her home country and is unable or unwilling
to return to his or her home country because of a well-founded fear of
persecution.39
1. Past or Future Persecution
The definition of “persecution” is ambiguous under U.S. law.40 However, in
In re Acosta,41 the BIA defined persecution as “a threat to the life or freedom of,
or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded
as offensive.” 42 The BIA also specified that “a government, or persons a
government is unwilling or unable to control” must inflict the harm.43 Thus, an
asylum applicant must prove that the government failed to adequately protect
him or her and that he or she suffered harm beyond some unspecified threshold
level.44
37. “The amendment was driven in part by the controversy in the U.S. over abortion rights .
. . anti-abortion groups successfully pressed Congress to oppose coercive family planning.”
Michelle Chen, Leaving One-Child Behind: Chinese immigrants seek asylum in America from
China’s one-child policy, LEGALAFFAIRS, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-Dece
mber-2005/scene_chen_novdec05.msp (last visited Aug. 11, 2016). There appears to be no such
movement behind domestic violence.
38. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
39. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 218–19 (B.I.A. 1985) (“A grant of asylum is a
matter of discretion. However, an alien is eligible for a favorable exercise of discretion only if he
qualifies as a ‘refugee’ under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act.” (citations omitted)), overruled in
part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (B.I.A. 1987).
40. See Scott Rempell, Defining Persecution, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 283, 283–84 (2013)
(“Persecution . . . remains largely undefined. The vagueness is at least partially intentional. Both
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the immigration regulations purposefully omit any
explanation of the meaning of persecution, thus leaving the task to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (Board) and the federal courts of appeals.”).
41. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
42. Id. at 222.
43. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222–23).
44. In re O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 25–26 (B.I.A. 1998). Through subsequent cases,
the BIA and the federal courts have attempted to delineate the boundaries of what may constitute
persecution, though they have avoided bright line rules. See Rempell, supra note 40, at 284.
Accordingly, persecution “encompasses a variety of forms of adverse treatment, including ‘nonlife threatening violence and physical abuse or non-physical forms of harm’ . . . .” Ivanishvili v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 340–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). But it “does not
encompass all treatment that society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”
In re V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (B.I.A. 1997). Finally, the BIA has held that the harm

2016]

A-R-C-G- is not the Solution

167

2. Well-Founded Fear
Another element to be proven in an asylum application is a “well-founded
fear” of persecution45—that is, there must be a rationally identifiable basis for
the fear. 46 Applicants that are found to have suffered past persecution are
afforded a rebuttable presumption of the existence of a well-founded fear of
further or future persectuion.47
3. Persecution “on Account of” Membership in a Protected Class
a. The Nexus Requirement
Once an asylum applicant establishes that he or she was subjected to
persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution, he or she must then
demonstrate that the persecution is “on account of” one of the five enumerated
grounds.48 This is known as the nexus requirement. The Real ID Act of 200549
requires that an applicant show that one of the enumerated categories “was or
will be at least one central reason” for the persecution.50
b. The Five Enumerated Categories
Lastly, the applicant must establish that the persecution was due to “race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”51 In the case of domestic violence victims, the only realistic option is
membership in a PSG. 52 Congress has not addressed the grounds for
establishing membership of a PSG.53 Rather, they have been developed through

suffered must constitute more than “mere discrimination and harassment” for persecution to be
found. O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 25.
45. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 219.
46. GERMAIN, supra note 20, at § 2.4.4 (“To establish a ‘well-founded fear of persecution,’
an asylum applicant must show that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would fear
persecution if removed to his or her home country.”).
47. Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 18 (B.I.A. 1989); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012); see also I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–82
(1992).
49. Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231.
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
51. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013).
52. Although some have made asylum claims based on the political opinion ground, and some
Immigration Judges have imputed one of the other four grounds as the basis for granting asylum,
the vast majority of the applicants claiming domestic violence as persecution use the particular
social group category. Bayes-Weiner, supra note 10, at 1055.
53. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) has defined a
“particular social group” as:
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being
persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be
one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity,
conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.

168

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 66:161

BIA decisions,54 which have generated three elements of membership in a PSG:
(1) a common immutable characteristic, (2) particularity, and (3) social
distinction.55
i. Common Immutable Characteristic
The first element was initially introduced in In re Acosta,56 in which the BIA
used the “well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis” to limit the scope of the
PSG category in order to maintain the integrity of the refugee definition. 57
Applying that doctrine, the BIA determined: “[W]e interpret the phrase
‘persecution on account of membership in a particular social group’ to mean
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of
persons, all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”58 Further, the
BIA stated that such a “characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color,
or kinship ties, or . . . a shared past experience.”59
ii. Particularity of Group
In the 2006 case In re C-A-,60 the BIA officially recognized the “particularity”
requirement for PSG first mentioned in In re Acosta.61 And in 2014, it clarified
that particularity is a separate and distinct requirement to the common
immutable characteristic requirement. 62 Further, it explained that the
particularity requirement refers to the “group’s boundaries” or “outer limits”
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 2: “Membership of
a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002).
Additionally, the UNHCR has provided that “[p]ersecution is normally related to action by the
authorities of a country.” U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992). However, “[i]t may also emanate
from sections of the population that do not respect the standards established by the laws of the
country concerned.” Id.
54. See infra Sections I.D.3.b.i–I.D.3.b.iii.
55. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014).
56. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 213 (B.I.A. 1985).
57. Id. at 233. “Only when this is the case does the mere fact of group membership become
something comparable to the other four grounds of persecution . . . . [I]n this manner, we preserve
the concept that refuge is restricted to individuals who are . . . unable . . . to avoid persecution.”
Id. at 233–34.
58. Id. at 233.
59. Id. Although determination of which types of characteristics would be made on a caseby-case basis, “whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” Id.
60. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
61. Id. at 955, 961 (holding that noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug
cartel in Colombia were not members of a particular social group).
62. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232 (B.I.A. 2014).
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because a group cannot comprise an entire society nor consist of an individual
with no one else.63
iii. Social Visibility to Social Distinction
In In re C-A-, the BIA held that “[t]he social visibility of the members of a
claimed social group is an important consideration in identifying the existence
of a particular social group for the purpose of determining whether a person
qualifies as a refugee.” 64 One year later, in In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 65 it
reaffirmed and explained that “[w]hether a proposed group has a shared
characteristic with the requisite ‘social visibility’ must be considered in the
context of the country of concern and the persecution feared.”66 In other words,
a claimed PSG must be recognized as such a group within the asylum-seeker’s
country.67 Following significant confusion about this factor, the BIA renamed
the “social visibility” requirement as “social distinction.” 68 Moreover, it
clarified that “literal or ‘ocular’ visibility” was not necessary. 69 Rather, the
“‘social distinction’ requirement considers whether those with a common
immutable characteristic are set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the
society . . . .”70
iv. Elements of a PSG Summarized
In summary, an applicant that claims asylum on account of membership in a
PSG “must establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3)
socially distinct within the society in question.”71 Domestic violence asylum
applicants have struggled to satisfy these requirements and have scarcely
received guidance from the BIA regarding how to successfully bring a domestic
violence-based claim.72
4. Inability or Unwillingness to Return to the Home Country
In order to meet the statutory definition of refugee, an asylum applicant must
also be “unable or unwilling to return to” their home country due to fear of
63. Id. at 238.
64. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
65. 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007).
66. Id. at 74.
67. Id.
68. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014); see also Matter of WG-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 212 (B.I.A. 2014) (“By renaming this requirement, we intend to clarify
that the criteria of particularity and social distinction are consistent with both the language of the
Act and our earlier precedent decisions.”).
69. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 228.
70. Id. at 238.
71. Id. at 237.
72. See discussion infra Sections I.E.1–I.E.3.
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persecution.73 This element arises from the non-refoulement principle, which
protects an asylum seeker from being removed to a country where “his [or her]
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 74
Such fears must be “well-founded,” meaning that a reasonable person in the
asylum seeker’s circumstances would also fear persecution if he or she returned
to the home country. 75 Although it is more common for applicants to be
“unwilling” to return, applicants can be “unable” to return if their countries
refuse to issue passports, or if they are denied re-entry.76
E. Two Non-Precedential and a Third Useless BIA Decision
The BIA has infrequently taken up the issue of domestic violence-based
applications.77 The first two times the BIA addressed the matter were fruitless.78
And the BIA’s most recent decision,79 which some argue settles the matter,80
seems to be an unreliable source of guidance for future applicants.81
1. First Failed Opportunity to Provide Direction
In the highly controversial case In re R-A-,82 the BIA reversed the grant of
asylum to a Guatemalan woman who had endured over ten years of physical83
and verbal violence.84 On two occasions, the police failed to respond to R-A-’s

73. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
74. GERMAIN, supra note 20, § 1.1.1 (alteration in original).
75. Id. § 2.2.
76. Regina Germain, Seeking Refuge: The U.S. Asylum Process, COLO. LAW., Oct. 2006, at
71, 72.
77. See Bookey, supra note 8, at 108–09 (stating that “no BIA or U.S. Federal Court of
Appeals decision has squarely held that domestic violence is (or is not) a basis for asylum in the
United States”).
78. See Matter of L-R-, supra note 4 (“[The] absence of applicable jurisprudential or
regulatory norms have resulted in contradictory and arbitrary outcomes and the failure of protection
for women victims of intimate partner violence.” (alteration in original)); see also discussion infra
Sections I.E.1–I.E.2.
79. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
80. See Asylum Law, supra note 12, at 2090 (“[In re A-R-C-G-] unambiguously establishes
that women fleeing domestic violence can be eligible for particular social group-based asylum, and
it will prove to be a boon to future asylum applicants.” (alteration in original)).
81. See discussion infra Section I.E.3.
82. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
83. See id. at 908–09. R-A- married at the age of sixteen and was almost immediately
subjected to physical and sexual abuse by her husband. Id. While in the relationship, R-A- suffered
a dislocated jaw when her menstrual period was late, violent kicking in her spine after she refused
to have an abortion, rape on a near-daily basis, kicking in the genitalia, sodomization, whippings
with an electrical cord, threats to chop her limbs off so that she could never leave, pistol whippings,
use of her head to break mirrors and windows, and blows to her head with fists and furniture. Id.
84. See id. at 908–10. R-A-’s husband often threatened that “calling the police would be
futile” because he was well-connected due to his previous military service. Id. at 909. He would
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phone calls; and three times, police took no action when her husband failed to
appear pursuant to a summons.85 Moreover, when R-A- had the opportunity to
be heard in court, a Guatemalan judge told her “he would not interfere in
domestic disputes.”86 In May 1995, R-A- fled to the United States in search of
protection.87 It took her fourteen years of litigation to get a final decision.
Initially, R-A-’s application for asylum was granted. 88 The Immigration
Judge (IJ) concluded that asylum was warranted because “of her membership in
the particular social group of ‘Guatemalan women who have been involved
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to
live under male domination.’” 89 The then-Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) appealed the IJ’s decision, arguing that R-A- had not claimed a
valid PSG and that she was not subjected to harm on account of her membership
in that group.90 Although the BIA found that R-A- was the “victim of tragic and
severe spouse abuse,” it refused to find that the abuse “occurred because of her
membership in a particular social group,” and thus, denied R-A- asylum.91
The BIA found that R-A- failed to prove that her claimed PSG was
“recognized and understood to be a societal faction, or . . . otherwise a
recognized segment of the population, within Guatemala.” 92 The BIA also
found that R-A- did not show that “spouse abuse is itself an important societal
attribute, or, in other words, that the characteristic of being abused is one that is
important within Guatemalan society.”93 Additionally, even if a PSG could be
found, R-A- had not established the nexus requirement as she did not show that
“her husband ha[d] targeted and harmed [her] because he perceived her to be a
member of this particular social group.”94 Also, she had failed “to show how
other members of the group may be at risk of harm from him.”95 Finally, the

also tell stories of killing babies and elderly people during his tenure in the army, and declare that
she would never be able to leave. Id.
85. Id. at 909.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The Immigration Judge:
[F]ound that such a group was cognizable and cohesive, as members shared the common
and immutable characteristics of gender and the experience of having been intimately
involved with a male companion who practices male domination through violence . . .
[and had] held that members of such a group are targeted for persecution by the men who
seek to dominate and control them.
Id. at 911 (alteration in original) (Board of Immigration Appeals reviewing Immigration Judge’s
unpublished findings).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 927.
92. Id. at 918.
93. Id. at 919.
94. Id. at 920 (alteration in original).
95. Id.
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BIA determined that the husband’s actions did not “represent desired behavior
within Guatemala or that the Guatemalan Government encourages domestic
abuse.”96
In direct response to the controversial BIA decision, proposed regulations
were issued for public comment in December 2000,97 clarifying what constitutes
a PSG and setting out a number of factors that could be added to claim review.98
In addition, Attorney General (AG) Janet Reno vacated the BIA’s decision
pending the issuance of final regulations. 99 However, final regulations were
never adopted.100
In the next administration, AG John Ashcroft certified In re R-A- to himself,
and accepted new briefs in February 2004.101 The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) argued that R-A- should be granted asylum based on her
membership in the PSG of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to
leave the relationship.”102 Ashcroft eventually remanded the case to the BIA
with instructions to decide the case once the final regulations were issued.103 In
2008, AG Michael Mukasey also certified In re R-A- to himself. 104 He
ultimately remanded the case back to the BIA, instructing it not to await final
regulations, but to decide the case based on other precedent 105 that had
developed in the interim.106
Finally, in December 2009, R-A- was granted asylum.107 The IJ’s decision,
which was one sentence, was based on the fact that the parties essentially agreed
to grant asylum. 108 Thus, after fourteen years of litigation and wavering
positions by the government and the BIA, domestic violence victims were left
with no additional guidance as to how to prepare a successful asylum claim.
2. DHS Intervenes and a Resolution is Dodged Again
A second unpublished case provided a potential solution but ultimately did
not result in any concrete rules.109 In May 2004, L-R- and her three children

96. Id. at 923.
97. DREE K. COLLOPY, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER 393 (7th ed. 2015).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 394.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 394–95.
105. See discussion supra Sections I.D.3.b.ii–I.D.3.b.iii.
106. COLLOPY, supra note 97, at 395.
107. Matter of L-R-, supra note 4.
108. See Natalie Rodriguez, Give Us Your Weary But Not Your Battered: The Department of
Homeland Security, Politics and Asylum for Victims of Domestic Violence, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 317,
333 (2011).
109. Matter of L-R-, supra note 4.
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arrived in the United States seeking refuge after almost two decades of domestic
violence.110 In her application, L-R- told numerous stories of substantial abuse
perpetrated by her common-law husband for more than a decade.111 L-R- also
explained that the police refused to assist her several times because it was a
“private matter.”112 In 1991, L-R- fled to California to escape the abuse, but
even then, he exerted control over her.113 He sent threats and forced her to send
him money.114 Eventually, he forced L-R- to return to Mexico, and the beatings
became even more violent.115 Following years of physical and mental abuse, LR- and her children once again fled to California in 2004.116
The IJ denied L-R-’s asylum application, finding that the type of persecution
she had suffered did not qualify her for asylum and that the abuse was not on
account of membership in a PSG.117 L-R- appealed that decision to the BIA.118
Though DHS initially filed a brief in support of the IJ’s decision,119 in 2009, it
filed a supplemental brief that was more in line with its position in the R-Acase. 120 DHS proposed two new alternative groups: “Mexican women in
domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and “Mexican women who are
viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.”121
DHS also suggested that the case be remanded to the IJ so that L-R- could refine
her claim according to the new proposed groups. 122 After reviewing the
additional evidence, DHS stipulated that L-R-’s application was eligible for
110. Id.
111. Amended Declaration of L-R- in Support of Application for Asylum at 2 (B.I.A. Dec. 30,
2005), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-asylum-support.pdf [hereinafter
Amended Declaration of L-R-]. L-R- was a 19-year old college student when her 33-year old
basketball coach began to abuse her. Id. at 4. The first time he raped her was at gunpoint, following
her school graduation. Id. at 5. When L-R- tried to leave the next day, he found her at the bus stop
and forced her back to his house where he held her captive for several years. Id. at 7–8. He
continued to rape L-R- and eventually she became pregnant. Id. at 8. When she was about two
months pregnant, L-R- tried to escape, but he found her and forced her back to his house. Id. That
night, while she was sleeping, he poured a flammable liquid all over the bed, and lit it and her on
fire. Id. After the child was born, he continued to rape her, yell at her, and hit her—in private and
in public. Id. at 9.
112. Id. at 9.
113. Id. at 10.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 11. One day, as she was walking home from her bus, he accused her of infidelity
and hit her until he had dislocated her nose. Id. at 12. On another day, L-R- had threatened to go
to the police after he had hit her, and in response, he took out a machete and threatened to kill her
with it if she went to the police. Id.
116. Id. at 22.
117. See Matter of L-R-, supra note 4.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Supplemental Brief for DHS at 29, Matter of L-R- (2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/
sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf.
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asylum, and soon thereafter, the IJ ordered the grant of asylum. 123 However,
because the BIA, AG, and federal circuit courts are the only entities capable of
creating binding precedential decisions, the IJ’s grant of asylum did not create
any binding law that could help other domestic violence claimants.
3. An Ineffective, but Precedential, Decision is Issued
In the landmark 2014 decision, In re A-R-C-G-,124 the BIA held that “women
fleeing domestic violence can be members of a particular social group.”125 This
decision marked the first time a binding decision had been issued on the matter
of domestic violence. The case involved a Guatemalan woman who faced
“weekly beatings” and “suffered repugnant abuse by her husband.” 126 She
contacted the police for help on several occasions, but was repeatedly told that
they “would not interfere in a marital relationship.”127 And when she tried to
leave numerous times, he always found her.128 In December 2005, C-G- left
Guatemala and sought asylum in the United States.129 The IJ determined that CG- failed to demonstrate eligibility for asylum, deciding that she had not suffered
past persecution and that she did not have a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of membership in a PSG.130 Instead, she was simply the
victim of arbitrary criminality. 131 Thus, the IJ denied C-G-’s asylum
application.132 On appeal, C-G- argued that she was eligible for asylum based
on the domestic violence she had suffered.133 However, DHS opined that the
IJ’s decision should be upheld.134 As a result, the BIA sought out supplemental
briefing and amici curiae “to address the issue whether domestic violence can,
in some instances, form the basis for a claim of asylum . . . .”135 In response,
DHS conceded that C-G- suffered past persecution and “that the persecution was
on account of a particular social group comprised of ‘married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.’”136

123. See Matter of L-R-, supra note 4.
124. 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
125. COLLOPY, supra note 97, at 396.
126. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389. Throughout the relationship, her husband
had broken her nose, burned her breast with paint thinner, and raped her. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 389–90.
131. Id. at 390.
132. Id. at 388.
133. Id. at 390.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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The BIA used the three-part test 137 for establishing membership in a PSG
(immutability, social distinction, and particularity) to review the case.138 With
regard to immutability, the BIA held that gender is an immutable characteristic
and that marital status could be deemed immutable if an individual is “unable to
leave the relationship.” 139 The BIA also advised that it was necessary for
adjudicators to “consider a respondent’s own experiences, as well as . . .
background country information.” 140 Regarding the second element, DHS
conceded that “the group in this case is defined with particularity”141 because of
its composition of terms with commonly accepted definitions that, when
combined, created “a group with discrete and definable boundaries.”142 Finally,
the BIA held that the group was “socially distinct within the society in
question.” 143 In making this determination, the BIA recognized that it must
“look to the evidence to determine whether a society . . . makes meaningful
distinctions based on the common immutable characteristics of being a married
woman in a domestic relationship that she cannot leave.”144 Such evidence may
consider “whether the society in question recognizes the need to offer protection
to victims of domestic violence, including whether the country has criminal laws
designed to protect domestic abuse victims, whether those laws are effectively
enforced, and other sociopolitical factors.” 145 In this case, the BIA found
“unrebutted evidence that Guatemala has a culture of ‘machismo and family
violence,’” and that laws against domestic violence were frequently not
enforced.146 Finally, the BIA pointed out that the issue of social distinction is to
be determined on a case-by-case basis.147
As compared to the two previous decisions, In re A-R-C-G- made huge strides
to set out a workable framework for future applicants.148 However, it still failed
to rule that domestic violence is a type of persecution for which the United States

137. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. &
N. 208, 212–13 (B.I.A. 2014).
138. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. at 392.
139. Id. at 392–93.
140. Id. at 393.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 394.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 395. In making this determination, adjudicators should consider the facts and
evidence, “including documented country conditions; law enforcement statistics and expert
witnesses, if proferred; the respondent’s past experiences; and other reliable and credible sources
of information.” Id. at 394–95.
148. Asylum Law, supra note 12, at 2090 (“[A-R-C-G-] unambiguously establishes that women
fleeing domestic violence can be eligible for particular social group-based asylum, and it will prove
to be a boon to future asylum applicants.” (alteration in original)).
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will give consistent protection. 149 Moreover, it still left much of the
determination up to the reviewing officer’s discretion.150 Progress was made,
but A-R-C-G- was not a solution.
II. PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED ASYLUM
Because there has been little legislative guidance, and case law has been vague
with respect to domestic violence-based asylum claims, a great deal of
scholarship has developed regarding the best path forward. Generally, these
proposals can be sorted into two broad categories: gender-based and genderneutral approaches.
A. Gender-Based Solutions
The vast majority of the solutions proposed for domestic violence victims
seeking asylum look to employ an analysis that uses gender as the basis for the
persecution. Gender-based persecution “refers to those asylum applications
made by women which are premised on issues that pertain specifically to their
gender.”151 In other words, women are persecuted for the simple fact that they
are women. Three gender-based solutions are commonly proposed.
1. Adding Gender as the Sixth Ground for Asylum
One proposal is that persecution based on gender, and more specifically, the
persecution of women, should be added as the sixth ground for asylum.152 Under
this approach, women would no longer have to try to shoehorn their claims into
the PSG definition.153 Accordingly, this would ease the burden for a woman
because she would only need to prove “persecution and that the persecution was

149. Id. at 2095 (“The Board declined to analyze whether (1) the harm C.G. suffered amounted
to persecution or (2) her membership in the particular social group was ‘at least one central reason’
for her persecution; the Board . . . explicitly affirmed that they will continue to be fact-dependent
determinations.”).
150. Id. at 2093 (“While A-R-C-G- provides definitive answers to some questions that have
split immigration judges, it provides less guidance on others; accordingly, it leaves open important
questions about which victims of domestic violence will qualify for asylum.”).
151. Anjana Bahl, Home is Where the Brute Lives: Asylum Law and Gender-Based Claims of
Persecution, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 33, 35 (1997).
152. See Leonard Birdsong, A Legislative Rejoinder to “Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians,
and Your Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . . .,” 35
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 197, 222 (2008); Elizabeth A. Hueben, Note, Domestic Violence and
Asylum Law: The United States Takes Several Remedial Steps in Recognizing Gender-Based
Persecution, 70 UMKC L. REV. 453, 454 (2001); Sarah Siddiqui, Note, Membership in a Particular
Social Group: All Approaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 524
(2010).
153. Crystal Doyle, Note, Isn’t “Persecution” Enough? Redefining the Refugee Definition to
Provide Greater Asylum Protection to Victims of Gender-Based Persecution, 15 WASH. & LEE J.
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 519, 548 (2009).
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on account of her gender”154 along with a “well-founded fear of persecution and
that her home government was unable or unwilling to control her persecutor.”155
Additionally, this would bring American law “in line with existing international
and current U.S. guidelines for adjudicating women’s claims.”156
However, this approach would require showing that the persecution was “on
account of” gender and not derived from one of the many other reasons for
domestic violence, which would be very difficult to prove. 157 Moreover,
because adjudicators have broad discretion in determining the “on account of”
factor, the approach could lead to inconsistent applications.
2. Allowing Gender to be a PSG
The most frequently proposed rule suggests allowing gender to comprise a
PSG. Two variations of this proposal exist: one in which “women” is the PSG,
and another in which “women plus” forms the PSG.
Proponents of the women-as-PSG theory base their proposals on the fact that
In re Acosta “expressly acknowledged that sex may form a particular social
group.”158 They argue that “if women can form a particular social group in
[female genital mutilation] cases, there is no reason why this should not apply
to women persecuted in other manners.” 159 This standard classification has
already received broad support in the international community.160 By including
“women” within the definition of a PSG, more victims will benefit from
protection.161
However, some have criticized this formulation by arguing that a group
cannot be “particular” if it “comprise[s] about half of society.”162 Furthermore,
defining the PSG “as ‘women’ fails to address the complexity of [domestic
violence] and thus renders refugees’ claims on this basis vulnerable to
rejection.”163 Moreover, using “women” as the PSG does not address the nexus
issue—the applicant must show that the persecutor was motivated by the fact
that the victim is a woman.164
154. Hueben, supra note 152, at 468.
155. Id.
156. Birdsong, supra note 152, at 222.
157. Doyle, supra note 153, at 554.
158. Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of Women
Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1238 (2009).
159. Id. (alteration in original).
160. Id. at 1239–40.
161. See Doyle, supra note 153, at 548–49.
162. Id. at 548 (alteration in original); Helen P. Grant, The Floodgates Are Not Going to Open,
but Will the U.S. Border?, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 43 (2006) (“Size of the social group is . . . an
important issue in determining whether a particular social group has been recognized.”).
163. Laura S. Adams, Fleeing the Family: A Domestic Violence Victim’s Particular Social
Group, 49 LOY. L. REV. 287, 294 (2003) (alteration in original).
164. Doyle, supra note 153, at 551 (“[A]sylum is only available to individuals persecuted on
account of one of the five grounds.”); Michael G. Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims of Domestic
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Another theory proposes that the PSG should be defined as gender (women)
“plus” some specific characteristic.165 One suggestion classifies “women who
have fled severely abusive relationships” as a PSG. 166 In this formulation,
leaving an abusive relationship is considered an immutable characteristic
because the woman would not be able to “change the fact that she took the actual
step of leaving” the relationship.167 Even if she returns, once she has challenged
her abuser’s power by leaving, there is a risk the abuser will increase the volume
or severity of his or her violent behavior to reestablish dominance.168 Thus, the
woman can likely show that she is being (or will be) persecuted on account of
the fact that she tried to flee the relationship.169
A second variation of the “gender plus” test recommends the use of nationality
as the “plus” factor.170 Under this approach, “domestic violence . . . occur[s] on
account of the victim’s gender and their nationality or tribal membership, which
allows for women to be harmed with impunity.” 171 Accordingly, this
formulation “gets to the heart of the issue: that women from these countries have
fled to the United States because their home country perpetuates sexist and
abusive behavior and allows for women to be so abused.”172
The gender plus formulation has garnered support in the Second, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits.173 Yet, some have criticized it for over-defining the PSG by
Violence: An Analysis of Asylum Regulations, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 133 (2008)
(“The refugee definition still requires the applicant to show that she fears persecution because of
her gender.”).
165. Lauren N. Kostes, Note, Domestic Violence and American Asylum Law: The Complicated
and Convoluted Road Post Matter of A-R-C-G-, 30 CONN. J. INT’L L. 211, 232 (2015); see also
Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence as a Basis
for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 362 (2009) (explaining that
gender can be considered a viable social group when combined with other refugee protection
criteria).
166. Cianciarulo & David, supra note 165, at 378.
167. Id. at 379 (“The most fundamental concept of a valid social group is a characteristic of
belief that a member cannot change, or one that is so fundamental to her identity that she should
not be required to change it.”).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 378–79 (“The punishable characteristic is the applicant’s ability and willingness
to challenge her abuser’s authority by leaving the relationship.”).
170. Kostes, supra note 165, at 232.
171. Id. at 233–34 (alteration in original) (“In some countries, the idea of ‘wife-beating’ is a
‘corrective’ measure to punish women for any transgression her husband or partner sees fit is
acceptable, normal, and held by both genders.”).
172. Id. at 233.
173. Id.; see also Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 663–64, 667 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that
the BIA erred in concluding that a social group consisting of all young women in Guatemala was
overly broad and not a PSG); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that a
petitioner’s gender combined with her ethnicity, nationality, or tribal membership was sufficient to
satisfy the PSG requirement); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
the BIA’s argument that petitioners must prove more than gender plus tribal membership for PSG
classification).
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adding descriptors to the “women” group, causing the potential exclusion of
some women seeking protection from the same form of persecution. 174
Additionally, while the gender plus formulation seems to be favored by asylum
adjudicators and has had some sporadic success, it has also “caused serious
jurisprudential problems . . . that have limited the capacity of this method to
provide asylum protection to all victims . . . .” 175 These narrowly defined
classifications also “create new hurdles for refugee applicants, who generally
struggle to prove that this shared characteristic is identifiable by would-be
persecutors or that their past persecution makes them a target for future
persecution.”176
3. Modifying the Nexus Analysis
The third prominent gender-based solution derives from international
standards and calls for a bifurcated nexus approach to the PSG analysis. 177
Under this approach, an asylum applicant has two routes for establishing that
persecution was on account of her gender.178 The applicant could argue that the
persecution occurred on account of her gender and that the state is unable or
174. See Stacey Kounelias, Comment, Asylum Law and Female Genital Mutilation:
“Membership in a Particular Social Group” Inadequately Protecting Persecuted Women, 11
SCHOLAR 577, 582 (2009) (explaining that women who fear they may undergo female genital
mutilation can be considered a PSG but only if the woman can prove female genital mutilation is
an established practice in a tribe or clan).
175. Doyle, supra note 153, at 549; see also id. at 537 (recognizing that the international
community has accepted that persecution based on gender can form the foundation for an asylum
claim, but that approaches incorporating gender into a PSG have been unsatisfactory).
176. Siddiqui, supra note 152, at 517 (emphasizing that victimized women who may attempt
to seek asylum will continue to encounter insurmountable hurdles until gender is recognized as a
PSG because gender plus formulations create PSG definitions that are too narrow and underinclusive).
177. See, e.g., Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 807–08 (2003)
(discussing how the BIA had wavered in utilizing a bifurcated nexus approach and suggesting that
it adopt the approach in In re R-A- to bring the United States in line with international standards);
Reimann, supra note 158, at 1257 (suggesting that the United States should adopt a bifurcated
nexus analysis in gender persecution asylum cases in order to bring its jurisprudence in line with
the international community); Siddiqui, supra note 152, at 523 (explaining that a bifurcated nexus
approach would create a causal link between a non-state abuser and the State’s inability or
unwillingness to protect the victim from abuse). It should be noted that the BIA rejected the use of
a bifurcated approach in the appeal of In re R-A-. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 923 (B.I.A.
2001).
178. Musalo, supra note 177, at 806. In this analysis, the “on account of” element would be
satisfied:
(1) where there is a real risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-state actor for
reasons which are related to one of the Convention grounds, whether or not the failure of
the State to protect the claimant is Convention related; or (2) where the risk of being
persecuted at the hands of a non-state actor is unrelated to a Convention ground, but the
inability or unwillingness of the State to offer protection is for a Convention reason.
Id.
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unwilling to provide protection against the abuser.179 Or, the applicant could
argue that “whatever the reasons for her husband’s actions, the state is unwilling
to protect her because of her gender.”180 This analysis would ease the burden of
the applicant because it would remove the requirement that applicants prove the
persecutor’s motivations and would refocus the inquiry on the government’s
refusal to provide protection.181 The bifurcated nexus has been utilized in the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia, and has been explicitly adopted
by The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) guidelines.182
4. General Criticism of Gender-Based Approaches
The overarching problem with a gender-based approach is that it ignores that
domestic violence victims can be male183 or female, and that domestic violence
can occur in heterosexual or homosexual relationships.184 While women may
be most willing to seek asylum based on domestic violence, there is no need to
close the door to men equally in need of protection. Some argue that men are
better protected around the world, but in countries where men are largely in
power and a “machismo” attitude prevails, men are unlikely to receive protection
for domestic violence because their cultures generally expect that they should be
able to protect themselves.185 Others may want to argue that men are better
equipped to deal with domestic violence because of their inherent strength, but
this is not true of a physically disabled man who is abused by his spouse and

179. Siddiqui, supra note 152, at 523.
180. Id. at 524.
181. See Musalo, supra note 177, at 779, 786 (asserting that when non-state actors are
involved, women have substantial difficulty showing a causal connection between their abuser’s
conduct and their gender because there is a presumption that the motivation underlying the abuse
is personal rather than related to the woman’s gender).
182. Id. at 779.
183. There exists some debate regarding whether men are, or can be, victims of domestic
violence. See Mary Z. Silverzweig, Domestic Terrorism: The Debate and Gender Divides, 12 J. L.
& FAM. STUD. 251, 251–52 (2010) (reviewing MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE (2008)); see also discussion supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the
findings of several studies regarding domestic violence against women and men).
184. See Shannon Little, Challenging Changing Legal Definitions of Family in Same-Sex
Domestic Violence, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 260–61 (2008) (finding that some studies
suggest that domestic violence occurs in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT)
relationships at a rate comparable to heterosexual relationships, and that men in same-sex
relationships are twice as likely to experience domestic violence than men in heterosexual
relationships).
185. Campbell, supra note 2 (“Men are reluctant to say that they’ve been abused by women,
because it’s seen as unmanly and weak.”). British men’s rights campaign organization, Parity,
claims that “men are often treated as ‘second-class victims’ and that many police forces and
councils do not take them seriously.” Id.
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may not even be able to try to protect himself.186 Similarly, a person in a samesex relationship may already be subject to prejudice due to the nature of the
relationship and is unlikely to receive protection.187 Ultimately, “gender does
not explain why domestic violence . . . is also perpetrated against men by
women, and occurs in same-sex relationships.”188
B. Gender-Neutral Solutions
A second category of proposals presents gender-neutral solutions to the
domestic violence-based asylum issue. The solutions that are put forth in this
category seek to modernize the asylum process more generally.
1. Eliminating the Grounds for Asylum
One radical gender-neutral solution that has been put forth is the elimination
of the five enumerated protected grounds, which would also eliminate the
problematic “on account of” requirement.189 This proposal is based on the fact
that the current grounds for asylum are “no longer appropriate,” because the
original law had been drafted to protect war refugees, and was “not necessarily
concerned with developing criteria that would be applicable to all people in all
places for all times.”190
2. Defining Family as a PSG
A second proposal aims to shift the focus from the reason underlying the abuse
to the state’s failure to protect the victim.191 Accordingly, under this approach,
the law would “provide international protection where a state fails to protect its
own citizens from harm,”192 and the PSG would be defined as “the family.”193
This PSG would challenge the assertion that asylum law cannot protect domestic
186. See Bayes-Weiner, supra note 10, at 1060 (providing that the Obama administration’s
asylum plan would preclude disabled men on the basis of domestic violence because of their
gender).
187. It is not difficult to picture a scenario where a man in a same sex relationship is not given
assistance because men are considered to be of equal strength and therefore capable of protecting
themselves. See Maya Shwayder, A Same-Sex Domestic Violence Epidemic Is Silent, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/a-same-sex-dom
estic-violence-epidemic-is-silent/281131/ (suggesting that a police officer may tell two men to
“work it out between yourselves”). Similarly, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which women are
considered incapable of committing domestic violence, and therefore another woman complaining
of domestic abuse is ignored. See Britni de la Cretaz, When Women Abuse Other Women, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/life/relationships/a37015/
intimate-partner-violence-in-lesbian-relationships/.
188. Adams, supra note 163, at 288.
189. Doyle, supra note 153, at 554.
190. Id. at 556.
191. Adams, supra note 163, at 295–96.
192. Id. at 296.
193. Id. at 298.
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violence victims because domestic violence is a matter of private harm.194 As
one commenter described, such an argument would be foreclosed because:
[A] state makes a political choice when it relegates the issue of
domestic violence to the private realm. That choice generates the
potential basis for a refugee claim, in that the state is now singling out
a particular group within society—the family—for differential
treatment that may lead to serious harm to members of the group.195
3. Family + Psychology as a PSG
Building off of the previous theory and employing a psychological
understanding of domestic violence, one scholar has recommended the inclusion
of a PSG defined as “Family Whose Member Violates and Controls Them
Without Government Intercession.”196 In this model, “Intimate Terrorism or
Coercive Controlling Violence”197 is pinpointed as the specific type of domestic
violence that is most likely to rise to the level of persecution that would render
an applicant eligible for asylum.198 This type of abuse includes severe physical
abuse, but also employs a “pattern of power, intimidation, and control.” 199
Additionally, this PSG identifies “the country of origin’s failure to protect the
victim as [the] causal nexus.”200 This approach has three benefits. First, it would
recognize “all victims, not just women, who meet the criteria for asylum as
domestic violence victims, no matter how rare the circumstances.”201 Second, it
would specify the type of domestic violence that the United States is willing to
recognize and for which it will provide protection.202 And third, this approach
would place the focus on the government’s failure to protect, and not force the
victim to explain and present evidence regarding why he or she was
persecuted.203

194. See id. (“Domestic violence is more than a private harm because the state fails to protect
victims of violence within families for the reason that these victims are members of a particular
social group . . . .”).
195. Id.
196. Bayes-Weiner, supra note 10, at 1058.
197. Id. at 1049.
198. Id. at 1049–50.
199. Id. at 1050. (“Control is perpetrated by any of the following means in varying
combinations based on the abuser’s preference: ‘intimidation; emotional abuse; isolation;
minimizing, denying and blaming; use of children; asserting male privilege; economic abuse; and
coercion and threats.’” (quoting Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Domestic Violence:
Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and Implications for
Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476 (2008))).
200. Bayes-Weiner, supra note 10, at 1058 (alteration in original).
201. Id. at 1059.
202. Id. This would also ease fears of opening the floodgate to excessive immigration, since
only eleven percent of cases consist of this type of violence. Id.
203. Id.
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C. Current Proposals Do Not Provide Consistent Protection
A significant amount of scholarship has been dedicated to improving the
current asylum system. Some have built upon prior case law while others have
looked to psychology or sociology for a solution.204 But in the end, most fail to
articulate the ideal solution—Congressional acknowledgement that domestic
violence is a form of persecution that the United States is willing to protect
against.
III. BOLD ACTION IS NECESSARY FOR A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION
At first glance, the BIA’s decision in In re A-R-C-G- appears to solve many
of the problems that plagued domestic violence asylum applicants in the past.
The decision (finally) created the binding precedent that “women fleeing
domestic violence can be eligible” for asylum based on membership in a PSG.205
However, it left open two important questions. First, the BIA did not address
whether the harm suffered would amount to persecution, and second, because
the DHS conceded the nexus requirement, the Board did not give any guidance
regarding how the nexus requirement could be fulfilled in future cases.206 Thus,
In re A-R-C-G- only nominally clarified whether asylum may be predicated on
domestic violence grounds. As a result, it is again left up to the IJs and the courts
to determine when domestic violence is a suitable ground for asylum. This is
problematic because it leaves too much discretion to adjudicators and reinforces
the system of inconsistent decision-making that preceded In re A-R-C-G-.207
Legislative action is needed to remedy the problems that have afflicted the
adjudication of domestic violence-based asylum claims. An amendment to the
definition of “refugee” and the creation of a new PSG are two methods by which
the issue may be resolved.
A. Appending Domestic Violence to the Refugee Definition
One potential solution is to append a sentence to the definition of “refugee”
identifying the circumstances by which domestic violence would qualify for

204. See, e.g., Cianciarulo & David, supra note 165, at 379 (“Leaving an abusive relationship
is an immutable characteristic. . . . The psychology of abusive relationships is such that the abuser
continues the physical and emotional abuse specifically to establish and maintain control over his
partner, and to punish any challenge to that control.”); Kostes, supra note 165, at 233–34
(advocating for nationality as a “plus” factor on the basis that in some cultures women are presumed
to be the property of men); Musalo, supra note 177, at 797–98 (advocating for the reinvigoration
of the bifurcated nexus approach in light of the precedential authority of a pair of BIA decisions—
In re Kasinga and In re R-A-).
205. Asylum Law, supra note 12, at 2090.
206. Id. at 2095.
207. Id. at 2093. One study of 206 asylum cases based on domestic violence found that
“whether a woman fleeing domestic violence will receive protection in the United States seems to
depend not on the consistent application of objective principles, but rather on the view of her
individual judge, often untethered to any legal principles at all.” Bookey, supra note 8, at 147–48.
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asylum. 208 While this may sound like a radical approach, it is premised on
previous congressional action. Again, Congress amended the definition of
“refugee” in 1996 to address the grave needs of a particular group being
persecuted.209 Like the issues that prompted Congress to act in 1996, domestic
violence is similarly grave. Thus, Congress should make a similar change to
INA section 1101(a)(42).210 Specifically, a satisfactory definition would state:
For the purposes of determination under this Act, a person who has
been subjected to abuse of the ‘Intimate Terrorism or Coercive
Controlling Violence’ 211 type, and who can show that the home
government is unable or unwilling to provide protection from the
abuse, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of their
membership in a particular social group.
Such an amendment would serve two important purposes: (1) Congress would
define the precise type of domestic violence that rises to the level of persecution,
and (2) it would reorient the focus of the analysis to the home government’s
inaction. This proposed solution clearly delineates the PSG for an asylum claim
to be based on domestic violence. Although “Intimate Terrorism or Coercive
Controlling Violence” is potentially burdensome to prove, it still provides an
unambiguous standard.212 In any case, this appears to be the type of domestic
violence that has warranted asylum in the past.213
B. Adding Domestic Relationship Status as Sixth Basis for Asylum
An alternate adequate solution would be to amend the definition of “refugee”
to incorporate “domestic relationship status” as the sixth ground for asylum.
This would allow an asylum applicant to claim persecution (the domestic
violence) on account of domestic relationship status.214 The addition of this new
208. Other scholars have made similar proposals. See Rodriguez, supra note 108, at 338;
Spencer Kyle, Safety Over Semantics: The Case for Statutory Protection for Domestic Violence
Asylum Applicants, 16 SCHOLAR 505, 543–44 (2014). However, this Comment is more forceful
and direct in its proposed changes.
209. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
210. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012)).
211. See Bayes-Weiner, supra note 10, at 1049–50.
212. See id. at 1059–60.
213. Id. at 1050.
214. This proposal differs from others because it takes the domestic violence victim entirely
out of the PSG configuration. Instead, domestic violence would be a new basis of asylum, in
addition to the current grounds of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, [and] political opinion.” Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000)). Additionally, this proposal is different from
previous PSG configuration proposals that employed the “domestic relationship” language because
it does not make use of any qualifiers. See, e.g., CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS: CGRS PRACTICE ADVISORY 11 (2014),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Domestic%20Violence-Based%20
Asylum%20Claims%20(Sept%2012,%202014).pdf (“Specific to Ms. L.R., DHS advanced two
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ground would be premised on the “well-established doctrine of ejusdem
generis”215 because individuals in a domestic relationship are arguably unable to
avoid persecution, because governments are unwilling to interfere in the “private
affairs” of a relationship. Additionally, although the BIA did not make this
finding in In re Acosta, another shared characteristic is that this type of
persecution occurs at high levels around the world. 216 Similarly, domestic
violence on account of status in a domestic relationship is a problem that plagues
all countries and sexes, and at extraordinary rates. 217 Thus, “domestic
relationship status” could rationally be added as the sixth ground of persecution.
This approach would have several substantial benefits. First, by using
“domestic relationship status,” the ground remains gender-neutral and affords
protection to both women and men. Although it is difficult to determine how
many men have attempted to use domestic violence as a basis for asylum because
such detailed statistics are not made available, the statistics do make clear that
men are subject to domestic violence, and thus, they should not be foreclosed
from protection simply because the numbers are relatively small.218 Second, it
allows domestic violence victims to bypass the difficult test of proving
membership in a PSG.219 Third, this new ground should more easily meet the
“on account of” element than the proposal to add gender as a sixth basis for
asylum.220 Specifically, adding “domestic relationship status” would comport
with the BIA’s finding in In re R-A- that “the husband’s focus was on the
respondent because she was his wife, not because she was a member of some
broader collection of women, however defined, whom he believed warranted the
formulations of a social group that it argued could meet the immutability, visibility, and
particularity requirements, depending on the facts in the record: Mexican women in domestic
relationships who are unable to leave; or (2) Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue
of their positions within a domestic relationship.”); see also Supplemental Brief for DHS at 14,
Matter of L-R (2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_
4_13_2009.pdf.
215. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“[The] doctrine holds that
general words used in an enumeration with specific words should be construed in a manner
consistent with the specific words.” (alteration in original)).
216. Facts and Figures: Ending Violence against Women, UN WOMEN (last updated Feb.
2016),
http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-fig
ures#notes (“It is estimated that 35 percent of women worldwide have experienced either physical
and/or sexual intimate partner violence or sexual violence by a non-partner at some point in their
lives.”); see Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (“The shared characteristic might be an innate
one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience
such as former military leadership or land ownership.”).
217. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
218. For instance, a commenter to an article about the Matter of A-R-C-G- decision claims to
“have a number of cases in which the victims are men and boys.” Comment by username S K
Williams to article by, Amy Grenier, Landmark Decision on Asylum Claims Recognizes Domestic
Violence Victims, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Sept. 2, 2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/
09/02/landmark-decision-on-asylum-claims-recognizes-domestic-violence-victims/.
219. Id.
220. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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infliction of harm.”221 Finally, by singling out domestic violence as a unique
form of persecution, it accords the proper level of scrutiny that domestic
violence deserves. It creates a universal awareness that domestic violence will
not be tolerated and also puts pressure on other countries to follow suit.
C. The “Floodgates” Argument Rebutted
Many scholars have asserted that the reason Congress has not yet stepped in
to resolve the domestic violence-based asylum issue is that there are fears that
once a precise rule is produced, it “will open the floodgates.”222 In other words,
“the borders would open beyond all reason,” risking “American economic and
social well-being.”223 The fear is intensified by the fact that statistics show that
domestic violence is endemic in Central American countries. 224 Such high
levels of domestic violence coupled with Central America’s proximity to the
United States may incite the (irrational) fear that too many victims will head for
the American border.225 However, concerns over the supposed floodgates effect
are overstated because (1) the refugee definition inherently limits asylum
applications, and (2) such an effect has not been experienced in other countries
that have made such a transition.226

221. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 921 (B.I.A. 1999). The Board relied on a series of
statements by R-A- and her recollection of statements made by her husband that explained the
abuse. Id. at 914–15. He told her “You’re my woman and I can do whatever I want” and “You’re
my woman, you do what I say.” Id. at 915. She testified that “he saw her ‘as something that
belonged to him and he could do anything he wanted’ with her” and that “as time went on, he hit
[her] for no reason at all” and he “would hit or kick [her] whenever he felt like it.” Id. at 909, 915.
222. Grant, supra note 162, at 5; see Jessica Marsden, Note, Domestic Violence Asylum After
Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J. 2512, 2553 (2014) (contending that the floodgates argument is
unprincipled); Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or
Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 132 (2007) [hereinafter Musalo,
Protecting Victims]; Reimann, supra note 158, at 1258; Rodriguez, supra note 108, at 340.
223. Grant, supra note 162, at 5.
224. In Guatemala, “36% of all Guatemalan women who live with a male partner suffer
domestic abuse.” Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, its Causes and Consequences: Mission to Guatemala, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.3,
at 11 (2005). In El Salvador, a 2008 national survey found that “44% of women who had been
married or lived with a partner had suffered psychological violence, 24% physical violence, and
12% sexual violence.” Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, its Causes and Consequences: Follow-Up Mission to El Salvador, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/26/Add.2, at 7 (2011). In Honduras, 74.6% of 16,000 complaints lodged in 2012 related
to domestic violence. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, its Causes and Consequences: Mission to Honduras, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/29/27/Add.1, at 1 (2015).
225. In 2014, roughly thirty three percent of the total asylum applicants in the United States
derived from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (13,847 of 41,920). See Asylum Statistics FY
2010-2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy2010-fy2014-asylum-statistics-by-nationality.pdf.
226. See Grant, supra note 162, at 5–7, 53 (providing a more in-depth discussion on the
“floodgates” topic).
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First, the refugee definition has built-in safeguards to avoid the floodgates
problem.227 Even if domestic violence is deemed to be a form of persecution,
applicants would still need to meet the other preconditions for asylum: the
domestic violence must rise to the adequate level of persecution, the fear of
persecution is well-founded, the applicant must prove nexus, and that he or she
is outside his or her country of nationality and is unable or unwilling to return
because of the persecution.228 By its nature, the “outside country of nationality”
element is one of the largest hurdles faced by potential asylum seekers. 229
Specifically, leaving one’s home country can be an extremely difficult task
because it requires significant resources,230 and, as is often the case in an abusive
relationship, the victim may not have access to the financial resources needed to
make the trip. 231 Also, if the victim has children, he or she must make the
difficult choice of either “leaving family behind, or exposing them to the risks
of travel to the potential country of refuge.” 232 This is further complicated
because many countries require that the non-travelling parent provide
permission to the travelling parent to move a child internationally.233 Thus, the
victim could be charged with kidnapping if he or she tries to move the kids to
safety without first obtaining permission from his or her abuser.
Furthermore, past experience has proven that the floodgates theory should not
be a concern. In 1993, Canada accepted gender-based persecution claims as a
legitimate ground for asylum.234 In the two years following, Canada received
40,000 refugee claims, of which only two percent were identified as genderbased. 235 Similarly, in 1996, when the BIA recognized that female genital
mutilation (FGM) could form the basis for a claim of persecution, 236 no
substantial changes in applicant volume occurred.237 Accordingly, at the time
227. Id. at 5–6.
228. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, §201, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (2000)); supra Section I.D.3.a (defining the nexus requirement); see also Grant,
supra note 162, at 52 (“[I]f they do flee and enter the border of the United States, they will only be
entitled to asylum after establishing all of the requirements of the refugee definition, which . . . is
not any easy task.”).
229. Grant, supra note 162, at 51 (“[B]efore she is able to seek asylum from the United States,
she must reach or enter the U.S. border.”).
230. Id. at 52.
231. Musalo, Protecting Victims, supra note 222, at 133.
232. Id.
233. Marsden, supra note 222, at 2555.
234. See Grant, supra note 162, at 53; Musalo, Protecting Victims, supra note 222, at 133; see
also Reimann, supra note 158, at 1217–18.
235. Grant, supra note 162, at 53 (“The [two percent] figure has not been broken down into
cases of domestic violence, but these would only represent a portion of the two percent.” (alteration
in original)).
236. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
237. See Questions and Answers: The R-A- Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERVS. (Dec. 7, 2000), http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/reference/additionalmaterials/immigration/asylum/government-documents/R-A-
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the In re R-A- decision was made, the INS stated that it did not anticipate “a
large number of claims based on domestic violence.”238 And, as one commenter
pointed out, even when the “potential beneficiaries [of American asylum policy]
included almost the entire adult female population of China,” 239 the United
States did not shy away from intervening on behalf of the victims of China’s
one-child policy.240
Finally, the potential size of the applicant pool should not bar the United States
from taking action on domestic violence. Asylum is currently allowed for
anyone who can base his or her claim of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, or political opinion—grounds that are broad and relatively
unrestricted, and grounds that did open up the United States to a flood of
applicants.241 Yet, asylum is permitted upon these grounds because we believe
that such persecution is so fundamentally wrong that it requires intervention.
Accordingly, by protecting the victims of such persecution, we send a message
to the world that these actions will not be tolerated. As the United States has
done time and time again, it should officially recognize domestic violence as a
viable grounds for asylum claims, to demonstrate to the world that domestic
violence is similarly intolerable.
IV. CONCLUSION
For more than fifteen years, IJs have grappled with the domestic violence
asylum applicant. The results have been pathetic—decisions are inconsistent
and fueled by personal beliefs and judgments. This has put many victims at risk
of continued persecution. In 1996, Congress took the extraordinary step of
changing the refugee definition to provide Chinese victims of coercive
population control methods a systematic route to asylum. Now, it is time for
Congress to acknowledge that domestic violence is a form of persecution that
requires similar action. The United States must demonstrate to other countries
that domestic violence will no longer be dismissed as a private matter or a mere
by-product of cultural norms. By amending the refugee definition and
promulgating specific standards, the domestic violence issue could be addressed
definitively and victims could finally be afforded the protection that the refugee
laws are meant to deliver.

Rule_120700Q%20and%20A.pdf/view; see also Musalo, Protecting Victims, supra note 222, at
132–33; Reimann, supra note 158, at 1259.
238. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., supra note 237.
239. Marsden, supra note 222, at 2553 (alteration in original).
240. Id.
241. Reimann, supra note 158, at 1260.

